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This paper explores the history of economic, social and environmental change associated 
with the Pine Point lead-zinc mine, a now-abandoned industrial site and town in the 
Northwest Territories. Recent perspectives in cultural geography and environmental 
history have sought to rehabilitate mining landscapes from their reputation as places of 
degradation and exploitation – the so-called “mining imaginary.” We argue that the 
landscapes of Pine Point epitomize the failures and contradictions of mega-project 
resource development in the north. While the mine and planned town built to service it 
flourished for nearly a quarter century, the larger goals of modernization, industrial 
development, and Aboriginal assimilation were unrealized. Ultimately, the mine’s closure 
in 1988 resulted in the town’s abandonment and the removal of the rail link, leaving 
behind legacy of environmental destruction that remains unremediated. At Pine Point, the 
forces of mega-project development joined with modern mining’s technologies of “mass 
destruction” to produce a deeply scarred and problematic landscape that failed in its quest 
to bring modern industrialism to the Canadian sub-Arctic. 
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Claiming the New North: Mining and Colonialism at the Pine Point Mine, 
Northwest Territories, Canada 
 
Along a remote stretch of highway on the southern shore of Great Slave Lake in 
Canada’s Northwest Territories, there once was a town named Pine Point (Fig. 1). At its 
peak, Pine Point’s population reached 2,000, and boasted amenities such as a golf course, 
a shopping centre, and hockey arena. Today, only echoes of the former settlement 
remain. You can still walk and drive along the orderly streets and sidewalks, but there are 
no buildings or street signs (Fig. 2). Drive out of town, and a maze of roads constructed 
out of crushed rock and gravel will lead you to a better understanding of who lived here 
and why the town existed. At one location, there is row upon row of core samples laid in 
collapsing wooden racks, a sign of the exploration work that accompanied the area’s 
transformation from remote bush country into a massive lead-zinc mining operation. 
Huge piles of waste rock and dozens of abandoned open pit mines, many of them filled 
partially or completely with water, dominate the landscape. The remnants of a 570 ha 
tailings pond have been covered with gravel, though there are still several small enclosed 
pools of water that are maintained at the site. An abandoned rail bed, the tracks removed, 
leads west from the former mill site to the transportation hub of Hay River, where it 
connected Pine Point to southern processing facilities and global markets that consumed 
3,158,168 tons of high grade ore and 9,628,000 tons of ore concentrate produced at the 
site between 1964 and 1988.1 
 
  
Fig. 1: Pine Point and other historic mining communities around Great Slave Lake, 




Fig 2: Abandoned Townsite, Pine Point (Photo, J. Sandlos) 
 
Geographer Richard Francaviglia has described such dramatically transformed 
landscapes as mining’s “hard places,” sites that exhibit the uniquely hardscrabble, but 
also tenacious relationship to place emblematic of mining communities.2 Drawing on 
Francaviglia’s work, a number of recent mining histories have dismissed what their 
authors deem the “mining imaginary,” the common historical narrative suggesting that 
mining communities and their local environments will inevitably be destroyed and 
degraded in the wake of a mine closure. This emerging school of thought argues that 
many mining communities have displayed a surprising economic and cultural resilience 
in relation to the notorious price cycles that cause sudden downturns and closure in large-
scale mining ventures. The end of a mine and subsequent withdrawal of large-scale 
capital enterprises from a community have in some cases offered opportunities for 
communities to develop alternative economic activities such as mine museums, 
cooperative business ventures, and ecological restoration initiatives that are locally 
controlled, community driven, and oriented toward social and environmental goals. 
Where outsiders may focus on mining’s ecological impacts, the individuals living in 
mining towns often maintain positive associations with the local landscape as a place of 
creative work that allowed for intimate contact with nature.3 
The abandoned mining landscape and town at Pine Point reminds us, however, 
that stories of environmental degradation and community collapse still have a place in the 
mining history literature.4 Indeed, the history of mining in Canada’s provincial and 
territorial northlands suggests that the critics of the so-called mining imaginary 
underestimate the extent to which their model of community resilience applies in all 
regional contexts. Certainly the narrative of boom, bust and community decline has held 
up quite well over time in northern Canada. Canada’s territorial north in particular is, in 
contrast to the lower forty-eight United States or United Kingdom, an isolated and 
sparsely populated region with a majority Aboriginal population in many areas. It has 
much in common with other remote circumpolar or Third World hinterlands where poor 
agricultural prospects, low population densities, and relative isolation from large markets 
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restricted industrial economic activity to the narrow exploitation of raw resources, 
particularly valuable minerals and hydrocarbons. A very few northern mining 
communities have managed to  reinvent themselves and cope with closure: Dawson City, 
Yukon has become a cultural heritage and mining tourism centre, while Yellowknife, 
NWT thrives as a mining supply centre and the territorial capital. Nevertheless, the 
dozens of ghost towns and abandoned mines that dot the landscape across the north 
represent a stark reminder of the dominant development pattern in the region.5  
Aside from regional considerations, the intensely local focus of the community 
resilience literature often fails to recognize how social, economic and ecological change 
in mining communities is mediated by forces both proximate and distant. The historian 
William Cronon suggests (with reference to Kennecott, Alaska) that the localized nature 
of mining communities should not distract us from considering “the paths out of town” 
that shaped them: not only the rail and road links that drew some remote mining regions 
into more direct contact with the outside world, but also the influence of people, goods, 
markets, and the state that all worked in concert to produce mining landscapes. While 
local people play a critical role shaping and reshaping mining places, mining histories 
must also account for the power of the state and private capital to transform and control 
social and ecological relations in remote mining operations.6 As important as it is to 
consider community agency and resilience, the broader political economy of industrial 
mining matters, a powerful mediating force the both enables and constrains the survival 
of mining communities in resource hinterland regions.   
The Pine Point lead-zinc mine offers a particularly significant historical example 
of the state and private capital imposing and shaping an industrial modernization agenda 
in a largely underdeveloped hinterland region. As the primary architect of post-war social 
and economic development policy in the territorial north, the Canadian government 
placed the Pine Point mine at the core of its broader northern development agenda, 
promoting the mine and its attendant rail link as a means to spark an unprecedented 
northward extension of southern Canadian capital and industrial activity to northern 
Canada. By the early twentieth century large corporate interests increasingly controlled 
base and precious metal mining activity; thus the lead and zinc deposits at Pine Point 
were unlikely to spark the kind of mass migration, settlement and development associated 
with the gold rushes of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the federal government used 
the mine as a means to promote internal colonization of its northern regions through 
planned and controlled industrial resource extraction, extending planning support, 
infrastructure and generous subsidies so that large private companies could be enticed to 
invest further in the economic salvation of what was perceived as an underdeveloped 
region.  
Instead of providing the spark for a more diversified and modern northern 
economy, however, the mine failed to fulfill its promise. In terms of the broader political 
economy of northern development, the closure of the mine served, for many critics, as an 
emblematic fulfillment of Canadian economic historian Harold Innis’ warnings about the 
economic dependency and volatility associated with staple resource exploitation in 
hinterland regions. On a local scale, Aboriginal communities close to the mine, 
particularly Fort Resolution to the east,  derived marginal economic and employment 
benefits from the mine and experienced severe disruption of their local economies and 
environments, part of a broader post-war pattern whereby southern development schemes 
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produced very few benefits for native northerners.7 The case of Pine Point illustrates the  
convergence of industrial primary commodity production mega-projects  and the 
neocolonial imposition of a modernization agenda on the supposedly backward native 
hunting and trapping economy of northern Canada.8 The Pine Point Mine was at the 
leading edge of a policy regime devoted to the re-territorialization of the northern Canada 
as the fountainhead of a primary resource supply chain leading south toward global 
commodity markets.   
Our analysis of the environmental and social impacts of the Pine Point mine on 
local Native communities and northern Canadian landscapes suggest that its history 
resonates as a First World example of the unjust distribution of harms and benefits 
associated with the Third World political ecology literature.9 Indeed, on a global scale, 
we suggest that the Pine Point story resembles other instances of indigenous conflicts 
with mining development, a process that  Richard Howitt has described in the Australian 
context as“dispossession, displacement, marginalisation and alienation in the period of 
rapid change precipitated by minerals-based industrialisation.” Whether in Australia, 
Papua New Guinea, Latin America, or northern Canada, these processes have been 
underwritten by ideologies of development and modernization, and the material-
discursive construction of remote regions as “primary-commodity supply zones.”10 The 
Pine Point mine was a catalyst for dislocation and dispossession, and its abandoned 
landscape remains a symbol of the political and economic power of outsiders to shape 
local environments in ways that serve the needs of national ambitions and global capital 
rather than those of local people. 
 
The Pine Point Mine 
 
 Pine Point was not the first large-scale mining project in the Canadian north. The 
history of mining in northern Canada properly begins with the Yukon gold rush in 1898, 
but the first large-scale industrial mines—what we would today call mega-projects—did 
not appear until the early twentieth century. Prior to World War II, the number of 
developments remained small, limited to high-value precious metals or strategic minerals 
in high demand on global markets. Key developments included the Keno Hill silver mine 
(1913), the Port Radium radium and uranium mine (1932), and three closely related gold 
mines on the northern shore of Great Slave Lake: Con (1938), and Negus (1939), and 
Giant (1948, though first staked in 1935).11 In the 1950s and 1960s, at the height of the 
post-war economic boom, mining companies proceeded with significant exploration and 
development activities at such sites as the lead-zinc deposits at Pine Point, lead deposits 
at Faro in the Yukon (the Cyprus-Anvil Mine), and nickel at Rankin Inlet, NWT. Pine 
Point was particularly significant, however, because of its emergence as a cornerstone of 
the federal government’s northern modernization agenda. 
Although the Pine Point mine commenced production in the mid-1960s, interest 
in the site stretches back to 1898. In that year, Ed Nagle, an independent fur trader based 
at Fort Resolution, staked the first eight claims in the area with the assistance of 
prospectors stranded while passing through the Great Slave Lake region on their way to 
the Klondike gold fields in the Yukon. The mineralization of the area was known to 
Nagle through interactions with local Aboriginal people, who used the galena deposits for 
making lead shot. Nagle’s claims attracted the attention of Geological Survey of Canada 
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geologists Robert Bell and J. Macintosh Bell, who surveyed the area in 1899 and reported 
on its lead, zinc and silver deposits. Without valuable gold, however, the Pine Point 
claims were allowed to lapse, and it was not until the mid-1920s that sustained corporate 
interest in the site materialized.12  
 The Oblate missionary and historian Rene Fumoleau has documented how these 
early mineral exploration activities directly stimulated federal government efforts to 
secure treaties with local indigenous people (referred to today in Canada as First 
Nations). The Aboriginal population of the southern Great Slave Lake area is Denesuline 
(Chipewyan) and Slavey, subgroups of the larger Athapaskan-speaking Dene Nation, 
which is distributed throughout the vast Mackenzie Basin region. In spite of centuries of 
contact and interaction with European fur traders, missionaries and civil authorities, 
before the 1890s, there were no agreements ceding land or resources to non-Native 
people in the north, as the land itself was considered useless for non-Native settlement. 
The Canadian government originally initiated negotiations for Treaty 8 in 1898 to secure  
land for settlers and miners in the Athabasca Region to the south, but extended 
negotiations to Great Slave Lake in 1899 at the insistence of Minister of Interior Clifford 
Sifton, who instructed NWT Indian Commissioner David Laird: “In view of the reported 
mining development in the Great Slave Lake Region it is important that a treaty should 
be extended to embrace that country if at all possible.”13 Signed at Lesser Slave Lake and 
Fort Resolution in 1899, the treaty aimed (from the government’s perspective) to 
extinguish Native land title and reserve resource rights, including mineral rights, to the 
Crown, in exchange for guaranteed access to traditional game resources for hunting, 
fishing and trapping, as well as annuity payments. By contrast, Aboriginal signatories 
believed they had agreed not to the wholesale transfer of ownership, but rather to shared 
access to land and resources, with basic protections for Aboriginal lifeways and benefits 
such as health care and education.14 
 Treaty-making and early mineral exploration laid the groundwork for the large-
scale landscape changes to follow. In the 1920s, Ed Nagle’s son, Ted, travelled to the 
region on behalf of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company with a six-member 
exploration team.15 As the major corporate actor in the Pine Point development, CM&S, 
a subsidiary of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and one of Canada’s emerging 
mining giants, played a central yet at times contradictory role in the project. CM&S, later 
known as Cominco, was founded in 1906, an amalgamation of several mines, mills and 
companies in the Kootenay mining district of British Columbia, centered around the rich 
Sullivan Mine and Trail lead-zinc smelter. The company was dominated by the CPR and 
its central Canadian directorship, which sought to provide traffic for the transcontinental 
railway’s Crow’s Nest Pass line. As Jeremy Mouat has shown, CM&S’s rise to 
prominence in the B.C. mining sector mirrored international industry trends towards 
metropolitan capital, heavy investments in technology for the refining of low-grade ore 
deposits (and the resultant changing labour arrangements), and the development of 
integrated mining, mineral processing, and transportation systems.16 Highly capitalized 
mining corporations—whether American giants like Kaiser Steel, the American Smelting 
and Refining Company (ASARCO), and the Kennecott/Utah copper company; British 
firms such as Rio Tinto; or the emerging Canadian conglomerate Noranda Inc.—created 
large-scale operations that integrated several separate, even far-flung ore deposits and 
milling operations with central smelters, while diversifying into different minerals or 
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other subsidiary concerns. CM&S branched out from its main base in lead-zinc to include 
gold, coal, copper and other mineral properties, and developed sidelines in gypsum and 
fertilizer production at the Trail smelter. As Tim LeCain argues, the domination of 
mining by large, integrated corporations emerged in tandem with a mining system of 
“mass destruction” involving the increasingly mechanized exploitation of low-grade ore 
deposits in open pits, often with devastating environment consequences at mine, mill and 
smelter sites.17 The history of environmental damage and international conflict over 
sulphur emissions at CM&S’s Trail lead-zinc smelting complex exemplified the often-
dismissive attitude of powerful North American mining corporations to local interests.18 
 After the initial scramble to establish and consolidate its Pine Point claims in the 
1920s, CM&S used its considerable influence with the federal government to limit 
competition for lead-zinc deposits, allowing the company (through a joint-venture 
subsidiary, the Northern Lead-Zinc Company) to develop the site at its preferred pace. In 
1931, a federal Cabinet order withdrew from staking a 98.5 square mile area around the 
original CM&S claims; subsequent Mines and Resources Department documents noted 
that “these reservations were not in favour of anyone, although it was pretty generally 
known departmentally at whose insistence they were made.”19 These reserved areas were 
cancelled in 1934, when the onset of the Depression and the attention drawn to radium 
and gold developments further north in the NWT (including CM&S’s own Con and 
Negus gold properties at Yellowknife Bay) halted virtually all development work at Pine 
Point. After the Second World War, the company resumed efforts to delineate and prove 
up the extensive ore body, as it became concerned over the potential exhaustion of its 
B.C. mines. To secure its position, in 1948 Cominco lobbied the federal government for 
the creation of a 500 square-mile concession granting the company exclusive rights to 
prospect for and stake lead and zinc deposits for a period of three years. A concession of 
such unprecedented size was justified by the company and federal mines officials by the 
nature of the ore body (consisting of extensive, low-grade deposits) and the early 
recognition of the potential for a mega-project scale enterprise requiring capital-intensive 
transportation, power and other infrastructure developments. CM&S and its partner 
Ventures Ltd. convinced federal officials that granting more or less exclusive corporate 
control over the region furthered the goals of “orderly development,” an increase in 
national revenues, and “the provision of employment for local inhabitants and the general 
increase of employment opportunities in the country.”20 Neither government officials nor 
CM&S made any attempt to consult with First Nations in Fort Resolution or Hay River to 
the west despite the fact the concession essentially alienated of a large body of land 
within traditional use areas and within the boundaries of the Treaty 8 territory.  
 In the 1950s, corporate interests, national development priorities and the 
international Cold War political economy converged at Pine Point. The CM&S desire to 
ensure a steady, long-term supply of feedstock for the Trail smelter was reinforced by the 
general optimism about base-metal markets. Post-war economic recovery and expansion, 
the lifting of wartime price ceilings, and the emergence of strategic Cold War demands 
for industrial minerals heralded a bright future for the Canadian mining industry. In 
particular, growing American domestic consumption was augmented by national security 
concerns, articulated in the 1952 Resources for Freedom, or Paley Report, to secure 
adequate long-term supplies and stockpiles of “strategic” industrial minerals. Canadian 
politicians and bureaucrats, eager to promote an agenda of hinterland economic 
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expansion, explicitly linked mineral policy and related developments to American 
resource demands.21 CM&S, for its part, bolstered its case for government infrastructure 
support with reference to these positive long-term market conditions, as well as forecasts 
of ore production from Pine Point lasting up to 50 years.22 This confidence in mineral-led 
development was reflected in federal reports that directly linked the mines at Pine Point 
and Yellowknife to “the long-range development of the whole of Canada’s new North,” 
and pledged assistance for the construction of hydroelectric dams, transmission lines, 
roads, harbours, airstrips and rail links to support large-scale mine and mill projects.23 
This northern development strategy promoted an increasingly interventionist role for the 
Canadian government in northern society and economy. In 1953, the federal government 
established a new Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources with an 
explicit mandate to further economic and political development in the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories. Mark Dickerson and Shelagh Grant have described this extension 
of federal government activities and interest in the north as the effective beginning of 
colonialism in the region.24  
 In the case of Pine Point, Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and Commissioner 
of the Northwest Territories, R. Gordon Robertson, began in the mid-1950s to promote 
the idea among senior government and CM&S officials that a railroad to the lead-zinc 
deposits on Great Slave Lake might serve as a catalyst for further economic development 
in the Mackenzie Region.25 In his 1955 brief on northern development to the Royal 
Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects, Robertson extended this argument, 
suggesting that a railway to the Pine Point area was critical to the national economy, 
concluding with the suggestion that the mine and the railroad would provide a gateway 
for the greater national purpose of northward industrial expansion: 
 
A railway to Great Slave Lake will not be just another railway. It is not a railway 
to a lake, or to open a mine or to serve a community. A railway to Great Slave 
Lake will be one of the great development railroads of the country. It will not 
bring population to the Northwest Territories to the same extent that the western 
railroads brought it to the prairies, but it may well bring in the years ahead a 
comparable increase in the wealth of Canada. This railway is quite different from 
most of the branch lines constructed in recent years which were destined to serve 
one mine, or a group of mines; its purpose is to open up a whole new region. The 
fact that there happens to be a potential mine of great value at its northern 
terminus is a piece of great good fortune, for it will enable this railroad to be built 
without the long wait for reasonable returns which so often has been the lot of a 
pioneer railroad.26  
 
The proposed Great Slave Lake Railroad was to be a catalyst for modernization in the 
north, according to Robertson, a spur not just to a chain of mines but also to the federal 
government’s colonial ambitions in the region.  
The linkage of a railroad and the mine to a much broader program of northward 
economic expansion became, in fact, an article of faith in the public realm and throughout 
the highest levels of government by the 1950s. In 1957, Prime Minister St. Laurent 
reiterated his government’s support for a rail link to Great Slave Lake in a speech 
delivered in the northern gateway city of Edmonton, declaring that “young Canada, in 
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search of new frontiers, is looking eagerly to the North. And while there are still all sorts 
of new worlds to conquer within the four corners of Canada, the North is beckoning 
us.”27 Such boosterism transcended party politics. In 1955 Robertson claimed that the 
grand task of northern development enjoyed the support of every political party in the 
country.28 Indeed, the election of 1957 that brought the Progressive Conservatives to 
power only added further impetus to the Liberals’ development policy, as the new Prime 
Minister John Diefenbaker sought to fulfill what he termed a “northern vision” of 
economic development that had featured prominently in the party’s platform.29 
Newspaper reports on the proposed railroad and mine echoed the unrestrained political 
enthusiasm for a northward turn in Canada’s development policies, a measure of the 
overwhelming consensus that the construction of a railway and the Pine Point mine was 
the key to unlocking the resources of northern Canada.30  
 Despite such broad consensus, the Canadian government did go to great lengths to 
assess whether the railway and mine would be economically viable. Senior bureaucrats 
produced data suggesting, for the most part, that shipping ore via railway would be 
cheaper than via an extended and upgraded Mackenzie Highway, as long as roughly 
250,000 tons of outbound freight were shipped out each year.31 They also insisted that, 
even if the federal government bore all of the estimated $50,000,000 capital expenditure 
on the railway as a means to make such a remote line feasible, over time it would cost the 
Canadian taxpayer nothing. Robertson emphasized this point in his brief to the Gordon 
Commission in 1955, where he invoked the relatively new concept of Gross National 
Product (GNP) to argue that the overall mine project would contribute $25 million in 
total economic growth in Canada, while taxes and royalties projected at $3.5 million 
annually would far exceed the $2,138,000 annual cost of amortizing the proposed federal 
railway subsidy.32 Government officials also studied intensively the relative merits of two 
proposed routes through northern Alberta, generally favouring the eastern route because 
the existing timber operations in Wood Buffalo National Park and the proximity to 
potential (though as yet unidentified) mineral deposits in the region presented greater 
opportunities for stimulating a broader program of northern development than 
agricultural operations in the Peace River region. A Royal Commission appointed in 
1959 nevertheless narrowly selected a western route originating at Grimshaw, Alberta.33 
Even if this was not the preferred plan amongst Northern Affairs officials, the Canadian 
government provided $99,547,345.20 in subsidies to the railroad, the highway to Pine 
Point and the construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Taltson River to provide power 
for the project.34  
Direct government support for the Pine Point project extended to the planning and 
development of a mining community near the mine. The new town of Pine Point was not 
to become a chaotic Wild West boomtown; nor would it be narrowly conceived as a 
company town. Instead, the government promoted the creation of a modern and carefully 
planned community to service the mine. Federal officials devoted considerable attention 
to site planning and questions of administration, since Pine Point was to serve as a model 
of orderly development and contemporary resource-town planning principles in the 
north.35 In early 1952, the Department of Natural Resources struck a planning committee 
that included senior resources and development officials, a planner from the Central 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Mines and Technical Surveys staff, and other 
government department (and occasionally company) representatives. Initial uncertainty 
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around the scope of the mine development led to caution among some, including the 
company itself, about the requirements for what would be “a mining town at best.” Early 
surveys and plans for a townsite, created in consultation with CM&S, sought to 
accommodate 1200 to 2500 residents in a fairly simple townsite located near the 
proposed mine and mill, although some estimates of the town’s ultimate population ran 
much higher.36 Yet town planning had stalled by 1953, as the company began to explore 
the use of open-pit mining methods at the site, which would entail a much smaller 
projected labour force producing a much smaller overall tonnage than previously 
forecast. This change in plans, in combination with declining lead and zinc prices and 
uncertainty about the construction of a railway, meant town planning virtually halted, and 
did not resume until early 1958. 
When CM&S relaunched plans to open the mine by the early 1960s, both the 
government and the company maintained their determination that Pine Point should not 
be a company town, but acknowledged that CM&S would play a large role in its design, 
construction and, at least initially, administration. With the Northern Administration 
Branch taking the lead, the 1953 plan was reviewed and revised to bring it in line with 
contemporary trends in resource-town planning, including new approaches to site 
preparation, street layout and zoning that aimed to replicate modern, “new town” 
planning principles. Notably, implementation and oversight of the town plan was turned 
over to the territorial government (GNWT), a creation of the federal government whose 
autonomy and role in local administration had nevertheless increased rapidly since the 
early 1950s. Although some Northern Affairs officials expressed concern about the 
GNWT’s capacity to undertake the development, the Territorial Government’s 
administration of Pine Point and the oversight of construction (largely undertaken by 
CM&S on contract) was supported by a $500,000 loan from the federal government, to 
be repaid from sales of town lots and assessments for services.37 
In spite of such large public subsidies and capital outlays, officials within the 
Department of Northern Affairs largely failed to construct airtight economic arguments 
for the extension of town, transportation and hydroelectric infrastructure to Pine Point. 
Roy Crump, President of the Canadian Pacific Railroad and one of the government’s key 
potential partners on the project, was openly critical of the business case the government 
had constructed to support the railroad. He mused publicly to the Yellowknife Board of 
Trade in September 1955 that a railroad to Pine Point was unlikely to be a paying 
proposition.38 One month later, Crump met with Robertson’s and Lesage in Ottawa, 
where he suggested that the projections of a revenue neutral railroad in the Gordon 
Commission brief was simply unrealistic.39 Crump may have been positioning his 
company for a large subsidy on the Pine Point project (certainly government officials 
thought this was the case), but Robertson’s notion that the railroad would cost the 
Canadian public nothing over its lifespan rested on several questionable assumptions: that 
the Pine Point mine or another successive mining operation would ship ore for fifty years 
(a projection that was very much a product of bureaucratic enthusiasm rather than a 
production guarantee from Cominco), that interest rates would remain at 3.5 percent or 
lower, and that southbound traffic would amount to a minimum of 450 tons of ore 
concentrate per day.40 While it is all too easy to criticize such numbers with the benefit of 
hindsight, it is difficult to believe that federal bureaucrats were unaware that the business 
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case for the mine and the railroad rested on inherently variable and unpredictable 
production figures and market conditions. 
Nor did the government’s crystal ball projections of future mine developments 
rest upon firm evidence that the railroad would generate significant mineral development 
beyond the Pine Point ore body. John McMynn, the Manager at Con Mine, suggested in 
1954 there were simply not enough proven high quality mineral deposits to produce an 
immediate mineral rush in the wake of the railroad extension.41 In 1960 Justice M.E. 
Manning, Chair of the Royal Commission on the railway route, claimed that geologists 
were more enthusiastic about mineral prospects further to the north of Great Slave Lake 
rather than along the south shore.42 Even within the federal bureaucracy, P.A. Koller of 
the Northern Affairs’ Economic Division, argued that there was “no chance” of lithium 
production proceeding on Great Slave Lake because there was no market for the metal.43 
The government’s stubborn insistence on investing in the railroad and mine project 
despite considerable doubt about market conditions and mineral prospects on a regional 
scale suggests that the Pine Point line and its attendant mine were both literal and 
figurative extensions into unknown territory.  
Faced with criticism, the government’s Pine Point boosters tended to fall back on 
the more abstract elements of the northern development agenda. Robertson responded to 
Crump’s skepticism, for example, by reminding him that there was “good ground for 
optimism” about the mineral potential of the region, and that rising demand for these 
metals in the coming years required planning for exploitation now. Robertson further 
emphasized the national importance of the project, casting it as an extension of nation-
building efforts in the past: “it would have been equally difficult in 1880 to have shown 
where all the freight would come from to justify the C.P.R.”44 C.H. Herbert, Chief of the 
Economic Division within the Department of Northern Affairs, countered the lingering 
doubts about freight potential and the mineral prospects of the region in similarly 
boosterish terms: “we would be completely lacking in faith in the future of the Mackenzie 
District if we did not feel that a sufficient number of mines would come into production 
to make the railway useful for at least fifty years.”45 He suggested “it would be most 
unwise to fail to develop the potential resources of the Mackenzie Basin and of the 
Northwest Territories in general,” because “these resources will be needed sometime.”46 
For the promoters of the mine and railroad within the federal bureaucracy, the 
government had an obligation to subsidize private industry so long as the attendant 
development activity would open up new regions of the north, the fruits of which would, 
in part, flow south to benefit a national economy that had drifted into recession by 1957. 
 Despite the government’s heavy emphasis on the themes of national and northern 
development, federal bureaucrats also took great pains to demonstrate the benefits of 
mine and railroad development for Native people in the Mackenzie region. Indeed, 
federal bureaucrats and politicians sold the railroad and the mine as a two-pronged 
antidote to what they perceived as a dire economic crisis facing northern Native 
communities. As with previous arguments, it was Robertson’s brief to the Gordon 
Commission that laid out the basis for promoting the mine as a boon for local people. 
According to the Deputy Minister, the hunting and trapping economy on which most 
Natives depended had largely collapsed due to game shortages (particularly a decline in 
the barren-ground caribou herds) and sharp decreases in fur prices. The solution, he 
argued, was to develop alternative employment opportunities so that Dene might remain 
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self-sufficient as they exploited the untapped resource riches of the Mackenzie Valley. 
The old economy that had dominated the north for three centuries was coming to an end, 
according to Robertson, and a rapid industrial revolution was the only possible solution to 
the problem.47  
Given the general push toward northern development, it is perhaps no surprise 
that the federal government began to promote the Pine Point railway and mine as the 
economic salvation for the Dene of the Mackenzie Valley. At a February 1956 meeting of 
the interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND), 
Robertson stated that the Northern Affairs Minister preferred to reject a Northwest 
Territories Council request for fur price supports, and instead recommended the rapid 
construction of the railroad to Great Slave Lake because the “main hope for increased 
economic activity lay in the development of mineral resources.”48 To shore up the 
government’s position, Robertson further warned in a departmental memorandum that 
increased relief payments would make it difficult to entice Natives into any kind of wage 
employment.49 Ultimately, the federal government had chosen to reject subsidies for the 
anachronistic fur trade in favour of very similar forms of government support for a 
mineral industry that signaled the dawn of a new north.  
 
The Local Realities of National Development 
 
 The government’s prediction of major employment opportunities at Pine Point for 
local Aboriginal people from Fort Resolution or Hay River proved to be more rhetoric 
than reality. Very few Native and Métis (mixed ancestry) people found employment 
during the intensive construction phase of the mine in the mid-1960s, though the 
company hired 27 men from Fort Resolution in January1964 to clear right of ways for 
roads and transmission lines.50 During the operational period of the mine, Native 
employment peaked at 17.1 per cent of the total mine workforce in 1970, but declined to 
between seven and nine per cent in the late 1970s (see Table 1). Cominco Vice-President 
R.P. Douglas claimed in 1975 the company tended to err on the side caution when 
compiling Native employment data, placing, for instance, Métis of uncertain ancestry 
under the general northern category.51 In contrast, Janet Macpherson’s research from the 
mid 1970s noted local resentment in Fort Resolution toward Cominco’s practice of 
including non-local Native labour in employment statistics, or double counting 
individuals hired multiple times in the same year, when trumpeting the local employment 
benefits associated with the mine.52 Certainly from 1973-76 Native people from outside 
the region did claim 24 jobs at the mine compared to 78 northern Natives, while in 1978 
nearly half the Native labour force (25 of 52 workers) was from south of the sixtieth 
parallel. Thus, the participation of local Dene from nearby communities such as Hay 
River and Fort Resolution may have been quite small at any given time. Testimony at the 
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline inquiry in 1975 suggested most Native workers were from the 
prairie provinces; only five or six Fort Resolution Natives had obtained steady work at 
the mines despite promises of extensive employment opportunities made at a community 
meeting held in 1960.53 For most local Native people, jobs tended to be short term due to 
high dismissal rates or employees leaving of their own accord. Between 1963 and 1977, 
the company authorized 125 hires of 92 Fort Resolution residents, but only ten of these 
workers lasted more than one year. In 1976 alone, Cominco hired 30 Fort Resolution 
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Natives to work at the mine, but only nine remained on the payroll by Christmas.54 This 
pattern was repeated across the Yukon and Northwest Territories: Native employment 
rates hovered at close to five per cent across the territorial north through the late 1970s 
and federal and territorial bureaucrats began to admit in several reports that a mining-led 
development strategy had largely failed to provide significant local economic benefits for 
Native northerners.55  
 
Table 1: Native Employment at Pine Point Mine, 1967-7856 
Year Native Labour Force Total Labour Force  Native Labour Force (%) 
1967 10 220  4.6 
1968 34 276 12.4 
1969 57 398 14.7 
1970 70 410 17.1 
1971 21 NA NA 
1973 39 535 7.3 
1975 46 637 7.2 
1976 NA NA NA 
1977 45 630 7.1 
1978 52 552 9.4 
 
Cominco and the territorial governments did make some attempts to encourage 
Native participation in the labour force. In March 1969 the territorial government hired a 
Native from Fort Resolution as resident Employment Liaison Officer, a position meant to 
ensure job openings at the mine were communicated locally and to recommend suitable 
candidates to the company. Eight months later, Cominco signed an agreement with the 
two levels of government and the United Steelworkers to create training positions for six 
local people per year, with government picking up half the wages and successful 
participants being granted preferential hiring as relevant positions became available. The 
program was not as successful as hoped: seven of 21 trainees were fired for absenteeism 
and another four had quit by 1971. Company officials suggested that those who 
successfully completed the program likely would have been hired on the open market 
regardless of the training. The resident Employment Liaison Officer position also failed 
to recruit many Fort Resolution residents to the mine. According to economist Paul 
Deprez’s 1973 report on the local impacts of the mine, the liaison officer did not have a 
clear mandate from the company or from either government, and the company largely 
favoured the advice of one of their existing employees with roots in the community.57 
The company continued with local recruiting efforts through the 1970s, however, 
maintaining the local liaison officer, organizing familiarization tours of the mine for 
Native communities, offering contract work for line cutting and brush clearing to the First 
Nations government at Fort Resolution, and proposing the creation of a local labour pool 
where any six Fort Resolution residents could commute to the mine on a company 
operated bus. Cominco officials took a dim view of the results of these initiatives, 
however, with Vice-President R.P. Douglas complaining publicly and to government 
officials that the Band Council turned down the bus offer due to the time involved 
commuting, and Natives from Fort Resolution abandoned a line cutting contract after the 
first payday.58 
Government and company officials blamed the general failure of these 
employment programs on local Native people. Comments ranged from sympathetic 
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(though essentialist) appraisals of Native workers’ inability to adjust culturally to 
industrial labour, to more outright racist sentiments that emphasized chronic welfare 
dependency and a poorly developed work ethic in communities such as Fort Resolution.59 
While there may indeed have been problems with cultural adjustment to mine work, 
issues surrounding reliability and transiency persisted in the entire workforce. Turnover 
rates for non-Native mine employees were in fact higher than for Natives in the early 
years of the mine.60  
Structural and systemic issues offer a more plausible explanation for low Native 
employment rates at the mine. Deprez highlighted the failure to extend the highway to 
Fort Resolution until 1972 as a practical problem, forcing prospective employees to 
separate from family during the work week due to the lack housing beyond bunkhouses at 
Pine Point, but also as a symbolic affirmation of Fort Resolution’s initial exclusion from 
the economic opportunities associated with the mine. Transcripts of community meetings 
in Fort Resolution from this period suggest that many residents had staked much of the 
town’s economic future on the road extension, not only for highway construction and 
mining jobs, but also to provide transportation corridors to support the local lumber and 
fishing industries. The eight-year lag between the opening of the mine and the highway 
extension was thus a bitter pill for the community to swallow.61 The federal and later 
territorial governments also failed to provide anything more than a scattershot approach 
to training Native employees for mine work; hence most skilled labour was imported and 
Native labourers were confined to unskilled or semi-skilled occupations.62 The unskilled 
nature of Native workers placed them in a double bind in terms of government and 
company policies; the company tended to offer the limited number of subsidized family 
unit houses to skilled employees as a retention device, placing local unskilled workers in 
bunkhouses or trailers. The territorial government did implement a housing program for 
northern residents in 1969, but established rents higher than Cominco housing because 
they did not want to establish subsidized housing as a standard policy in northern mining 
communities.63 At the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry hearings, Fort Resolution 
resident John Morin criticized the northern housing program because it classified people 
as northern residents who had only lived in the territories for three years, a policy that 
favoured outsiders, particularly skilled apprentices transitioning to steady jobs at the 
mine, rather than local labourers.64  
In more general terms, the fact that the company and the territorial governments 
began to establish northern housing, employment, and training programs roughly four 
years after the mine had opened—and then only in an ad hoc and sometimes token 
fashion—affirms that the colonial objective of northward economic expansion took 
precedence over local development initiatives. The federal government, in particular, was 
willing to devote nearly $100 million in direct subsidies to the extraction and transport of 
non-renewable resources, but almost nothing toward ensuring that the benefits of this 
new mining economy would flow through the surrounding local communities. By the 
mid-1970s, Fort Resolution derived very little economic benefit from the mine despite 
the vast amount of mineral wealth that was being exported from the South Slave region: 
over $400 million in net profit between 1964 and 1989.65 
If the mine failed to generate significant and lasting economic benefits for local 
Native communities, it did leave a legacy of large-scale landscape and environmental 
changes, many of which persist to the present. Mining at Pine Point employed the large-
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scale, open-pit methods developed in the early twentieth century in conjunction with 
selective flotation ore recovery technologies, a new approach to mineral extraction that 
resulted in often devastating environmental consequences. CITE TIM From the 1950s 
and throughout the life of the mine, exploration crews conducted drilling activities and 
cut hundreds of geophysical lines across the landscape (Fig. 3). The mining operations at 
Pine Point exploited 50 separate Mississippi Valley-type deposits consisting of a swathe 
of widely dispersed, near-surface orebodies extending over 1600 square kilometers.66 
Most of the ore was extracted using open-pit (or open-cast) methods (Fig. 4), although 
two underground shafts were also sunk to extract deeper deposits. In addition to the 
removal of overburden, miners extracted more than 69 million tons of ore over the life of 
the mine, at average grades of seven per cent zinc and three per cent lead. Large Euclid 
haul trucks transported ore along a network of hard-surfaced haul roads to the company’s 
concentrator, which opened in 1965 with a capacity of 5,000 tons per day, later expanded 
to 8,000 then 11,000 tpd through the installation of additional crushing and selective 
floatation circuits to separate the concentrate from the waste rock. During the life of the 
mine, the concentrator generated 82 million tons of tailings that were carried in slurry and 
deposited in a low-lying containment area north of the concentrator site. 67   
 
 
Fig. 3: The Pine Point mining district, showing roads, cutlines, and mine activities. Map by Charlie 
Conway. 
 





The development of the mine and its attendant infrastructure preceded effective 
environmental regulation in the Northwest Territories by either the territorial 
government, which exercised very limited responsibilities regarding land and resources, 
or the federal government. Environmental protection legislation was virtually absent, 
beyond the poorly enforced anti-pollution provisions of the federal Fisheries Act. The 
revised Canada Mining Regulations proclaimed in 1961 outlined prospecting, claim-
staking, mineral tenure and development rules, but remained silent on questions of 
environmental impact, pollution control or mine site remediation.68 Federal and territorial 
officials charged with overseeing the mine’s development remained primarily concerned 
with maximizing the potential economic benefits for the mine. Environmental protection 
issues raised during the planning and early development phases of the mine were 
confined to questions of how air pollution policy might affect the potential construction 
of a smelter at Pine Point.69  
Concerns about the local environmental impacts of the mine operation emerged 
from both government scientists and local Native people in the 1970s. Initial concerns 
focused on the mine’s tailings containment and pit dewatering practices. A 1972 study by 
federal Department of Environment scientists explicitly linked their investigation of 
heavy metal contamination from Pine Point’s tailings area to the broader issue of 
effective mine pollution control policy in the Northwest Territories. Their study 
undertook water sampling, sediment and vegetation sampling, and the analysis of tissues 
and organs from fish taken from the waters of Great Slave Lake near the mine. At this 
time, the company discharged its mill tailings from a T-shaped trestle, the decanted 
overflow effluent filtering through the surrounding muskeg and, eventually, reaching 
Great Slave Lake. The authors concluded that, while the values for heavy metals and 
other contaminants in nearby lake waters generally remained below safe concentrations, 
there remained some risk of spikes in contaminant levels during seasonal runoff or due to 
the inefficient operation of the tailings control system. Sediments and vegetation in the 
area between the tailings pond and the lake were contaminated with copper, cadmium, 
lead, and zinc.70 
The same year, an engineering assessment of the mine’s wastewater handling 
procedures was similarly critical of the tailings disposal system. The Laval University 
research team echoed the biological report’s concerns with seasonal overflows of the 
tailings pond, especially during spring thaw, when frozen tailings and snow cover 
combined to send large volumes of effluent water over the dykes of the containment area. 
This report also highlighted the problem of pit dewatering at Pine Point, whereby 
millions of gallons per day of water containing sulphides and mineral salts was pumped 
from the open pits under excavation and discharged directly into local creeks, and thence 
into Great Slave Lake.71 Although neither tailings overflow nor pit water appeared to 
cause severe water quality problems, concerns about water pollution resurfaced at NWT 
Water Board hearings in the late 1970s, particularly from local land users concerned 
about groundwater contamination, reduced wildlife populations and potential human 
health impacts.72 
As land users with long-standing economic interests in wildlife harvesting, 
Aboriginal people (at Fort Resolution in particular) actively protested the habitat impacts, 
loss of access to traditional resource sites, and damage to traplines associated with the 
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extensive mining activities. In spite of government efforts to direct Aboriginal people 
away from trapping, Fort Resolution residents engaged in seasonal hunting and trapping 
activities across the entire region east of the Slave River (although these activities were 
reportedly restricted on Cominco property).73 As mineral exploration of the area 
proceeded, Métis and Dene trappers found their traplines destroyed by bulldozers 
ploughing the hundreds of kilometers of geophysical lines. The mine came under severe 
criticism by Fort Resolution residents at hearings held in the community in 1975 as part 
of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry. Harold Bosley [likely Balsillie] testified,  
 
[W]hen they opened up that Pine Point… there was six of us that 
was trapping down there. When they opened up the mine there, and when 
we went back to our traps, they had been cutting lines there right on our 
trapline and between the six of us we lost about 200 traps and we never 
got no return for it…74 
 
Other testimony highlighted residents’ concerns about water quality in creeks, streams, 
and Great Slave Lake, as well as their resentment of pressures on recreational sites and 
fish and game populations from non-Natives from Pine Point.75 
The deterioration of the mixed jack pine/black spruce forest in the Pine Point 
vicinity may have exacerbated these impacts on wildlife species (and the people 
depending on them). A critical Canadian Forestry Service report from 1975 suggested 
that mine exploration activities, pit dewatering and highway construction had altered the 
area’s complex water regime, resulting in tree deaths from flooding or ponding of water, 
in some cases, and lowering of the water table in others. Echoing the 1972 water study, 
the author argued that “planning and development within the extraction complex has been 
poor with respect to social and environmental degradation” and that the extensive 
denudation of the surface vegetation would have a long-term negative impact due to slow 
revegetation in the northern climate.76 Testimony from Fort Resolution residents 
corroborated these criticisms of widespread tree mortality, especially near the highway. A 
later forest study discounted the effects of pit dewatering, but confirmed that highway 
construction had resulted in large areas of pine mortality due to interrupted water flows.77 
Even far from the mine, the development of infrastructure produced severe 
environmental impacts. The construction Twin Gorges Dam in 1963 and the Nonacho 
Dam in 1968 to power Pine Point caused significant ecological change in the Taltson 
River watershed several hundred kilometers to the east. A traditional knowledge study 
produced in collaboration with the Denesuline community of Lutsel k’e (a roadless 
community on Great Slave Lake east of Fort Resolution situated near the Taltson 
watershed) suggested major social and cultural impacts due to the changes the dams 
brought to flooding regimes and water levels in the region. These included: the flooding 
of commonly used trails, traditional hunting and trapping areas, and grave sites; the 
destruction of fur-bearing habitat due to the flooding of five distinct lakes, their attendant 
wetlands, and their connecting waterways; the destruction of bird habitat on submerged 
islands; changes to caribou crossing routes; and finally, a decline in the quality of fish 
harvests (with individuals becoming thinner and laden with cysts) due to possible 
mercury contamination attributed to rotting vegetation in the reservoir. Lutsel k’e 
residents also reported that ice thicknesses had become unstable within the Talston 
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watershed; many blame the drowning of two trappers in 1992 on dangerous and 
unpredictable ice conditions associated with the dams. As with Fort Resolution’s 
relationship to the mine, the community of Lutsel k’e received almost no employment 
benefits, and no hydro-electricity, from the Talston River dams, but bore the brunt of the 
environmental costs associated with the ancillary infrastructure that powered the Pine 
Point development.78  
The closure of the mine in 1988 brought an end to production at Pine Point, but 
not to environmental concerns. In response to the Fort Resolution community’s 
longstanding concerns about water quality, in 1995 a series of investigations of 
contamination from previous operations and from the decommissioned mine and tailings 
site were undertaken. The authors reviewed previous investigations dating back to the 
1970s, and conducted sediment coring, fish sampling and water quality sampling in Great 
Slave Lake offshore from Pine Point, in Resolution Bay near Fort Resolution, and in the 
Slave and Little Buffalo rivers. These studies discounted long-term or widespread 
contamination or human health threats from the operation of the mine, although noting 
some localized, elevated levels of heavy metals in sediments, and of mercury and arsenic 
in fish organs.79 
Federal and territorial officials considered the decommissioning of the mine site 
as a success. An abandonment and restoration plan called for the covering of large 
dewatering wells adjacent to the open pits (allowing them to fill with water), securing the 
two underground adits, installing fences or large berms surrounding the open pits, and 
blocking access to the network of haul roads criss-crossing the area. Ironically, the effort 
to restrict access to the Pine Point property proved to be one of the controversial features 
of the closure, as it blocked access to hunting, camping and trapping sites for local 
residents. Cominco attempted some selective revegetation of waste rock piles, though 
with varying degrees of success. The company also capped and graded the tailings area 
with rough gravel to prevent wind and water erosion of the tailings, secured the dykes at 
the edges of the tailings area, and constructed a permanent spillway to permit the 
treatment of runoff from the tailings area to remove soluble zinc before discharge.80 
Beyond these efforts, no ecological restoration was undertaken, and mining impacts 
remain the significant defining features of the Pine Point landscape. 
Perhaps more poignantly, the removal of nearly all equipment and infrastructure – 
including mine and mill buildings, the rail line and the entire town itself – signaled the 
finality of the town’s demise. The company sold houses for nominal prices to be hauled 
away, and Pine Point homes can be found in Fort Resolution, Hay River and communities 
in Northern Alberta. The town’s hockey arena came to rest in Fort Resolution. The 
company bulldozed rest of the town, including its new school. Within a year of closure, 
the town of Pine Point—cornerstone of state regional development and modernization 




The example of Pine Point and dozens of other abandoned northern Canadian 
sites offers a useful corrective to recent perspectives of cultural geographers and 
landscape historians who have sought to question narratives of environmental 
degradation and community collapse following mine closures. At its best, this literature 
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reminds us of the complex and contested meanings of place and community at such sites. 
Even at Pine Point, we find there are complex and competing views of history and 
landscape, including for Aboriginal people; as one Métis man who formerly lived in Pine 
Point noted, the mine was a mix of “the good and the bad.” Former residents maintain a 
nostalgic website celebrating the friendly community and the region’s mining past. In a 
broader northern Canadian context, Liza Piper has argued that mines are not necessarily a 
blight on the landscape but can be understood as integrated in symbolic and material 
ways with the local biophysical in which they are embedded.82 While regarded by 
“outsiders” as brutal, degraded or even toxic, former mining landscapes may be 
touchstones of community identity and memory, and provide both material and cultural 
resources for economic recovery or even political resistance. In Ben Marsh’s terms, place 
identity in such communities serves as both means (of material continuation or survival) 
and meaning (drawn from the past as a resource for this persistence).83 
The total erasure of the community at Pine Point and the dispersal of its residents 
suggests, however, that the attempts to critique the so-called mining imaginary often fail 
to consider the persistence of catastrophic community impacts associated with the mining 
experience. Nor do they recognize the wider ideological and political contexts shaping 
the establishment and fate of mining districts. We argue that histories of hinterland 
development must account for the colonial nature of state and capitalist-driven 
modernization agendas, even in so-called First World settings. These conclusions 
resonate with recent suggestions that environmental historians devote more attention to 
issues of power and injustice in North America. Paul Sutter, for instance, has recently 
invoked the example of South Asian environmental histories in calling for greater 
attention to social inequality in histories of North American conservation and 
environmentalism.84 Drawing from the geographical subfield of political ecology (which 
focuses broadly on conflicts over resource management and environmental degradation in 
the Global South), we contend that an analysis of colonial patterns of development 
emerging from Third World studies may be applied in First World contexts such as the 
Canadian north. Though couched in the rhetoric of regional economic and social 
development, the expansion of mining (and its attendant infrastructure) into this region 
was devoted almost exclusively to the extraction of valuable resources, rather than 
promoting social and economic benefits for local Aboriginal communities. In the end, 
Pine Point remained an outpost of the southern Canadian resource economy, rather than a 
secure beachhead for long-term social and economic progress. Pine Point’s legacies of 
landscape dereliction and social dislocation are ultimately rooted in neocolonial attitudes 
towards people and territory, and serve as cautionary tales for contemporary pro-
development discourses in the Canadian north, however couched in terms of economic 
sustainability or the rhetoric of local benefits. 
 Indeed, since 2008 mineral development has returned to Pine Point. A junior 
mining company, Tamarlane Ventures, recently received permission from territorial 
regulators to develop remaining ore bodies left over from the Cominco operation. For 
many local people, the prospect of renewed mining at the site has stirred negative 
memories of their exclusion and lack of control over previous rounds of industrial 
development. The environmental assessment report on the Tamerlane Project reported 
that Aboriginal communities in the South Slave region had raised concerns about wildlife 
and fisheries impacts, lead–zinc contamination, and groundwater impacts associated with 
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the new project. According to the report, the historical memory of the original Cominco 
mine is alive and well in the regions: “Aboriginal groups [in the South Slave] have 
concerns about the lack of closure to outstanding concerns with the historical Pine Point 
Mine east of the Buffalo river, which shut down in 1987 [sic]. Both the former operator 
(Cominco Ltd., now Teck Cominco) and INAC [Department of Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada] were criticized for the lack of resolution to community concerns about 
long-term impacts on lands, waters and wildlife.”85 While some Aboriginal people 
welcome the economic opportunities associated with a new mine, for others the empty 
pits, the ghost town and the decommissioned rail line serve as reminders of the intense 
social, environmental and economic changes brought by past mine development and 
abandonment. At Pine Point, the colonial history of mining is ever-present in the 
negotiations over the impacts and benefits of the industry for the region.  
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